The stock maiket expects virtually all additional resources provided to debtor countries to be used for debt service to commercial banks. The stock market capitalization of banks increased about $6 billion at the time of the 1983 U.S. proposal to increase its quota to the IMF by $8.5 billion, and by a low estimate of $22.4 billion at the time details of the Brady Plan were recorded.
Two types of event have affected returns of estimate of $22.4 billion at the time details of the banks that are heavily exposed to third world Brady Plan were recorded. debt in the 1980s: actions by the debtor countries (such as declarations of moratorium) and
The estimate of the magnitude of these official actions (such as changes in regulations effects is infornative, but the emphasis should and in the provision of official monies to the be on the direction of these effects, as they are debtor countries).
robust to overestimation problems.
The effect of the first type of event has been Clearly official resources provided to debtor extensively investigated. There are fewer studies countries do devolve to creditor banks. But the analyzing the effect of official actions on bank debtor countries should at least gain insofar as stock retums. DemirgUc,-Kunt and Huizinga the reduction of a debt overhang eliminates investigate to what extent official money tvailinvestment distortions. able to debtor countries has devolved to the banks, as reflected in stock market prices.
The results here stem from the fact that some of the monies provided by the multilaterals are They find that the stock market expects specifically earmarked for debt service or are in virtually all additional resources provided to the form of general balance-of-payments support debtor countries to be used for debt service to that the developing countries can use for private commercial banks. The stock market capitalizadebt service. Official creditor resources that arc tion of banks increased about $6 billion at the specifically provided to finance developrnient time of the 1983 U.S. proposal to increase its projects are less likely to be allocated to bank quota to the IMF by $8.5 billion, and by a low debt service. Two types of events have affected returns of banks that are heavily exposed to third world debt during the 1980s: actions by the debtor countries, such as declaration of moratoriums, and official actions such as changes in regulations and in the provision of official monies to the debtor countries.
The effect of first type of events has been extensively investigated. Among these studies Schroder and Vankudre (1986) , , Bruner and Simms (1987) , and Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) study the effect of Mexico's 1982 default; Sachs and Huizinga (1987) and Musumeci and Sinkey (1987) study the effect of Brazil's 1987 debt moratorium, and Ozler (1990) investigates the effect of 1978-1983 international loan reschedulings on bank stock values.
There are fewer studies analyzing the effect of official actions on bank stock returns. Change in regulations, for instance, is analyzed by Eyssell, Fraser and Rangan (1989) who investigate the effect of amendments in regulations governing international banking operations. The effect of official monies, more specifically the effect of indirect provisions made available as increases in resources of international financial institutions, has been studied by Cornell, Landsman and Shapiro (1988) and Billingsley and Lamy (1988 governments. Apparently, the stock market went through a learning process early in the debt crisis after which a pattern of large official balance of payments loans from the multilateral institutions that were partly used for private debt service was clearly established.
Of the $8.5 billion U.S. quota increase of the IMF, we estimate that about $6 billion indirectly accrued to private banks worldwide. The recent World Bank quota increase of $74.8 billion however, did not clearly affect bank stock return at its passage as the increase had been fully anticipated.
The IMF quota increase of around $60 billion announced in May 1990 negatively affected bank stock returns. This is due to the fact that the market expected a greater increase whereas the United States was able to prevent the quota subscriptions from increasing by more than 50 percent.
In the case of the Brady Plan, the paper abstracts from the details of the menu by which debt reduction actually takes place that can be important to the banks as shown by Demirguc-Kunt and Diwan (1990) . While the initial reaction to the debt reduction plan wps unclear, during the period of March 16
to March 20 when the extensive IMF and World Bank involvement in debt reduction was secured, bank returns showed a significantly positive reaction.
Interestingly, heavily exposed banks seem to have benefited less per dollar of LDC debt than the lowly exposed banks, although for both types of banks repayment prospects should have been affected equally. Heavily exposed banks may have benefited less, as their contingent claim on the FDIC was reduced while repayment prospects improved. Huizinga and Ozler (1990) have shown that the relationship between LDC exposure and bank valuation is nonlinear due to., federal deposit insurance. Important news concerning the repayment prospects of LDC debt of course affects the value of the banks' contingent claim on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Judging from the lowly exposed banks, the $24 billion made available for debt reduction appears to have increased the present value of debt payment by $22.4 billion. This result confirms Bulow and Rogoff (1988) who have shown that the Bolivian debt buyback of (1988) mainly benefited the banks. Comparing the experience of the lowly and highly exposed banks, we estimate that the U.S. banks contingent claim on the FDIC has been reduced by approximately $9 billion.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology and the data. Section 3 discusses the events and presents the main results. Section 4 concludes.
The main aim is co infer from stock prices the transfer to the commercial banl:s implicit in the provision of official monies to the debtor nations. To start, let us consider che following bank valuation equation:
where MVi is the bank value for bank i, LDCi is the present value of the expected LDC debt repayment, NLDCi is the market value of the bank's non-LDC The coefficient 6 in (2) measures the proportion of the loans that is expected to be transfered to the canks. All banks are expected to be repaid in proportion to their exposure, i.e., __Cij__ E i
The coefficient e S LDCJ S E..
measures the indirect iripact of official transfers to debtor nations on banks' claims on the FIDIC. For a lowly exposed bank. ei is close to zero while for highly exposed banks ei may be substantially negative. As for each bank S + ei will be estimated jointly, values of ei can be inferred by comparing 6 + ei for highly and lowly exposed banks.
Our sample of banks consists of roughly 21 exposed and 9 non-exposed U.S. banks, depending on the particular event. A list of banks is given in Table 1 . As shown, exposed banks are grouped as highly and lowly exposed banks based on their exposures. Data on daily bank and market returns, for the period January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1988, are obtain-' from the tapes constructed by Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. The market return is dividend inclusive return on the S&P 500 index. Individual bank exposure data on individual countries is obtained from
The Country Exposure Lending Surveys.
Following Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) and Eyssell, Fraser and Rangan (1989) , the following set of n linear equations is estimated first.
(3)
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where Rit is the return on the stock of bank i on day t. Rmt is the market return, Dt is a duimmy equal to 1 during the event period of three days inc'.uding the day before and after the event, and zero otherwise.) The system is estimated for the complete year, with daily returns for each year in which events took place.
For the set of exposed banks only, the following alternative system is estimated:
Rnt-an + nRmt + 7enDt + ent where Ei is Eij given L:. Now -6 + e mv i f Eij ~~enn The systems are estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 1 Using the same dummy variable for multiple dates is to capture leakages and lags of information, and is common in event studies. See for instance, Eyssell, Fraser, and Rangan (1989), and Grammatikor and Saunders (1990).
technique, which allows for contemporaneously correlated disturbances. 2 Th4s technique is most appropriate for estimation of a system of equations which have nonzero correlation across their residual terms due to implicit relationships. In the above systems implicit relationships exist since all banks are members of the same industry.
The hypotheses to be estimated are:
The event parameters are zero for a group of banks.
The event parameters are equal to each other for a group of banks.
The groups of banks we consider are the set cf exposed banks, the set of nonexposed banks, and all banks together. Hypotheses are tested separately for all three groups of banks.
For system (3), we expect the event parameters 7di as a group to be different from zero for the exposed banks and for all banks togA.ther while the parameters should be zero (and equal to each other) for the non-exposed banks.
If the event parameters for the non-exposed banks are different from zero, this indiLates investors can not correc:-.. j distinguish between exposed and nonexposed banks, which is a form of contagion. Also, if the event parameters for the exposed banks are equal to each other, this points at contagion as it indicates stock market investors can not distinguish between heavily and lowly 2 See Zellner (1962) for a discussion of the technique. Using SUR in estimation of system (3) is not necessary since SUR estimator collapses to OLS estimator when all the independent variables are the same. However, using this technique leads to efficiency gains in estimation of system (4). we cannot estimate system (4). Estimation of system (3) for the loan to Argentina is reported in Table 3 . Fourteen of the eighteen exposed banks are shown to have a positive return during the three day event period. The hypothesis that event parameters are zero is rejected for the exposed banks, and for all banks together, but only at 10 percent level for the non-exposed banks.
The hypothesis that the event parameters are equal is rejected for all the three groups of banks. The means for the event parameters (7 the heavily and lowly exposed banks are 0.88 and 0.52 percents respectively, indicating that some information about individual bank exposure was known to investors.
Bank investor response to the agreement between Brezil and the IMF in December 1982 was much less favorable. During the event period, 16 of the 18 banks experienced negative excess returns. The hypotheses of zero event parameters is rejected at the 5 percent level for all banks, but only at the 10 percent level for the exposed banks. Apparently, stock market investors had anticipated a s ghtly more favorable loan. Also, for the announcement of the large IMF loan to Mexico, we find that the hypothesis of zero event parameters can not be rejected.
The final loan of this sequence to Chile was approved on January 10,
1983. According to a WSJ article of January 4, 1983, there was considerable doubt whether this loan would be approved. The results of Table 3 show that The results of estimating systems (3) and (4) are in Table 4 , showing six of eighteen exposed banks experience positive excess returns at least at the 10 percent significance level. Estimates of the market model parameters a; and pi are the same as those reported in Table 3 . The non-adjusted event parameters are significantly different from zero for all banks, and the hypothesis that they are the same is rejected. However, the event parameters
for the non-exposed banks for themselves are also different from zero, and in fact 3 non-exposed banks have significantly positive individual returns. This points to contagion, where investors can not distinguish between exposed and non-exposed banks. However, this does not point to market inefficiency if stock holders did not yet have information about individual bank exposures.
Bank annual reports for the year 1982, which were published around March and April of 1983 were the first to contain obligatory information on individual bank exposure. The exposure-adjusted event parameters are jointly different from zero, and the hypothesis that they are equal to each other can not be rejected. This is strong evidence that stock investors indeed are aware of bank exposures.
The means of the exposure adjusted event parameters are equal to 0.142 and 0.398 for the sets of highly and lowly exposed banks. This difference can be attributed to contagion which causes investors to bid up stock of lowly exposed banks too much relative to the stock of highly exposed banks, or it may reflect the role of deposit insurance. Heavily exposed banks have a relatively large claim on the deposit insurance agency. Thus as the repayment prospects of LDC debt improve, heavily exposed banks stand to see their claim on the FDIC go down in value more than lowly exposed banks.
Hence, one expects the stock of heavily exposed banks to rise proportionally less, even if markets are fully rational.
The estimated values of the exposure-adjusted event parameters in Table 4 can be used to estimate the increase in shareholder wealth during the estimation period. The estimated mean value of the exposure-adjusted event parameter is 0.242. This means that, as there is a three day event window and as the quota was to be increased by $8.5 billion, that stockholders wealth was expected to increase by $6.2 billion. As U.S. banks hold roughly 24 percent of LDC debt, at the time, this means that U.S. bank stock rose by $1.5 billion while foreign bank stockwealth rose by $4.7 billion. Thus, the U.S. quota These increases, unlike the U.S. increase of its IMF quota in 1983, were the result of lengthy reviews within the multilaterals and of negotiations between principal member countries. Thus, bank stock response at the time of the fiscal agreements is only relative to previous market expectations. Table 6 shows the results of estimating (3) and (4) for a 3-day event period
surrounding the announcement of the World Bank capital increase. One highly exposed bank experienced a significantly positive excess return, and one lowly exposed bank experiences a significantly negative excess return. The hypotheses that the event parameters for the exposed banks are zero or equal are both rejected. Moreover, no clear pattern is evident in the estimated event parameters. Evidently, the actual acceptance of the World Bank capital increase was not major unexpected news.
The IMF quota increase of 50 percent was passed officially on Monday, May 7, 1990. However, the day before the G-7 already released a communique endorsing the 50 percent increase. According to a later WSJ article this accord represented a victory of the U.S. which aimed to limit the increase in IMF capital. 7 France and the IMF itself had sought a 100 percent increase.
Thus the passage of the accord can be expected to be negative news to the banks. This is confirmed by Table 7 , which shows that excess returns on While the estimated magnitude of these effects are informative, the emphasis should be on the direction of these effects as they are robust to overestimation problems. Clearly, official resources provided to debtor countries do devolve to,creditor banks. However, the debtor countries should at least gain in so far as the reduction of a debt overhang eliminates investment distortions. Our results sterA from the fact that some of the 'monies provided by the multilaterals are specifically earmarked for debt service or are in the form of general balance-of-payments support that the developing countries can use for private debt service. Official creditor resources that are specifically provided to finance development projects are less likely to be allocated to bank debt service. Notes: * and # indicate significance at 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Significance levels for market parameters are not reported. Hypothesis 1 tests whether all coefficients are equal to zero and hypothesis 2 tests whether they are all equal. Subscripts e, no, and a refer to tests for the groups of exposed,non-exposed, and all banks respectively. F values are reported. 
